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Abstract 
Since 1980, national university departmental ranking exercises have developed in 
several countries.  This paper reviews exercises in the U.S., U.K. and Australia to assess 
the state-of-the-art and to identify common themes and trends.  The findings are that the 
exercises are becoming more elaborate, even unwieldy, and that there is some retreat 
from complexity.  There seems to be a movement towards combining peer evaluation 
with bibliometric measures.  The exercises also seem to be effective in enhancing 
university focus on research strategy. 
Introduction 
These are trying times for university research administrators in the Anglo-Saxon 
world.  Research administrators in several countries await the results of national scale, 
departmental level research rankings: UK administrators await the results of the current 
RAE; US administrators await the release of the latest NRC rankings; Australian 
administrators no longer know what to expect after the recent cancellation of the RQF.  
Given the decades’ long history of multi-university, departmental-level research 
evaluation in each country and given the salience of the exercises for funding and 
success, there is a rich tradition of critique and discussion of the evaluation exercises.  
However, this literature tends to be not just nation-specific but even specific to 
disciplines within nations.  This paper takes the opportunity to compare the structure and 
evolution of multi-university research evaluations at a key point in their history. i   
In seeking common themes, I find that each system is undergoing redesign, 
suggesting that the state-of-the-art is evolving.  Evaluation redesign involves extensive 
consultation with the academic community which tends to encourage increased 
complexity.  The complexity is threatening to become unmanageable however, and 
simplifications imposed by government loom.  In addition, bibliometric metrics are 
becoming more important and are increasing in sophistication.  Finally, universities seem 
to be very responsive to ranking systems, thus system performance can be increased 
using these methods. 
The United States and non-governmental rankings 
In the United States the research quality of university departments is publicly 
assessed in what might be termed “freelance” ranking projects.  These contrast with the 
government mandated exercises conducted in the U.K. and Australia.  Here I focus on the 
influential rankings of the National Research Council of the National Academies rather 
than the possibly better known U.S. News and World Report rankings or the emerging 
swarm of alternatives. 
The elaborate ranking exercise conducted by the National Research Council 
(NRC) of the National Academies was undertaken in 1983 and 1995 and is currently 
underway as of early 2008.  With its ranking the NRC hopes to provide potential students 
and the public with accessible information on doctoral programs, and to help universities 
improve the quality of programs through benchmarking and so enhance the nation’s 
overall research capacity.  No funding will be allocated as a result of these rankings, but 
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due to the respect afforded the NRC, they will be extremely influential in attributing 
prestige to individual departments and will heavily influence graduate student choice and 
the desirability of departments as a place to work. 
The 1995 rankings were heavily analyzed, usually by scholars analyzing ranks 
within their own disciplines.  Broadly speaking, the studies seem to examine the virtues 
of different ranking systems, or seek to offer advice to those trying to rise in the rankings.  
In the 1995 exercise departments were ranked based on a reputational survey.  
Bibliometric information, i.e. departmental level publication and citation counts, were 
reported in appendix tables but were not incorporated into the rankings.   
Methodological question marks mar the NRC 1995 study.  Miller et al. examined 
the political science rankings and noted that given response rate, resulting sample size 
and sampling error, it was statistically unsound to differentiate the rank ordering of many 
schools.  The NRC report did present confidence intervals in an appendix.  Nevertheless, 
mean ratings were reported “with two decimal places thereby implying more precision 
than the data warrant.” (Miller et al., 1996, p. 716)  The exercise did not generate the 
quality of data required to rank departments with any confidence.  Miller et al. also noted 
that the NRC bibliometric data contained an obvious error: the University of Houston 
reportedly had no citations.  Neither the NRC nor the data provider could explain this 
because resource limitations precluded checking the accuracy of the publication and 
citation counts.  Even simple validations such as ensuring names were spelled correctly 
were not undertaken. 
Given departmental concern to improve in the rankings, the main attributes 
underpinning results were examined closely.  Departmental size was found to be a main 
driver (see for example Jackman and Siverson, 1996).  The NRC acknowledged this and 
argued that size is an important determinant of quality since bigger programs are broader 
and have more resources and faculty (alternatively one could argue that size is important 
for the perception of quality).  Jacman and Siverson find that faculty research 
productivity is not conditional upon faculty size (Jacman & Siverson, 1996), casting 
some doubt over the contention that size is a measure of research quality.  Curiously 
though, nobody seems to have produced a ranking of departmental quality based solely 
on number of faculty.  In other words, the size variable seems to need “laundering” 
through a reputational survey to become a legitimate basis for ranking, even for those 
who argue that equating size with quality is legitimate.   
Scholars show far more interest in exploring research productivity as a basis for 
ranking than size, using bibliometrics to measure productivity.  Dusansky and Vernon 
(1998) compared reputational and bibliometric departmental rankings in economics.  
They conclude that the reputational ranking and publication productivity ranking seem to 
be based on somewhat different information.  They also conclude that reputational 
rankings lag changes in publication productivity.  “Established programs appear to be 
able to maintain their reputations in the face of declines in their publication productivity, 
while more aggressive upstart programs must be patient in realizing the full returns from 
their substantial investments in professorial capital” (Dusansky & Vernon, 1998, p. 170). 
The NRC’s current ranking method emerged from examining the shortcomings of 
its past rankings.  The NRC convened a committee of eminent academics to study past 
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NRC rankings and recommend improvements.  The committee analyzed the criticisms of 
the 1995 report and concluded that the 1995 ranking because it was based on a 
reputational survey is now seen as too “soft”.  They recommended that the 2007 ranking 
be based on quantitative variables.  A small reputational survey will be conducted, and a 
regression analysis will be used to identify a weighted mix of quantitative variables that 
best predicts reputational judgments.  Departments will be ranked based on this weighted 
mix of variables.   
The NRC has thus required from all departments wishing to be ranked submission 
of information on the 48 variables to be included in the ranking formula.  The 48 
variables concern institutional characteristics (i.e. total research expenditure, 
characteristics of library, childcare and health insurance availability, university housing 
for PhD students etc.); doctoral program characteristics (i.e. size, time to degree, financial 
support, facilities for PhD students, test scores, support provided, employment 
destinations etc.), and program faculty (size, demographics, awards, bibliometrics etc.) 
(NRC, 2004, Table 4.1).  For the bibliometrics, the NRC will compile full bibliographies 
of SCI indexed papers and their citations from Thomson-Scientific and use this 
information to calculate three bibliometric variables: 1) % of faculty publishing, 2) 
publications/faculty, 3) citations/faculty. 
The current NRC method is more elaborate than the 1995 version, and this has a 
cost.  Planning for the exercise began in 2000; it was originally scheduled for 2003-2004 
and slated to cost $5 million (direct cost only); it was actually conducted in 2005-2006 
for release in 2007; the latest word is that results will be released in late spring or early 
summer 2008.  It remains to be seen whether the NRC can deliver the promised method 
and if it does, whether the level of accuracy will be acceptable to the community.  The 
method and results are guaranteed to be subject to endless analysis by academics. 
The U.K. Research Assessment Exercise 
The Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) is a government-mandated evaluation 
of research quality in every department in every UK university. Its purpose is to inform 
the distribution of core research funding to the 160 universities, and it has been 
conducted by the British government five times since 1986.  I estimate that 
approximately 25% of all research support in UK universities is allocated based on the 
RAE ratings of their departments.  These allocations are quite stable.  As a result of the 
2001 RAE, only one institution saw its total revenues affected by more than 3.7 per cent 
and the median impact was less than 0.6 per cent (Sastry & Bekhradnia, 2006). 
The RAE methodology has evolved over the years and grown increasingly 
complex, but in 2008 it remains a peer review evaluation of departmental research output 
on a seven point scale (alternatively, departments could be ranked).  The exercise began 
with relatively simple submission requirements in 1986.  Departments described their 
research achievements in two pages, listed their five best publications and provided data 
on research income, prizes etc.  This method was criticized, as for example favoring large 
departments with their larger pool of papers from which to choose the top five.  In 
response, the method evolved so that submissions now include greater detail on research 
environment and strategy; list four publications per individual and other data.  The 
original four point scale was elaborated to seven – framed as five plus two.  In 2008, 68 
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panels of reviewers were convened to consider departmental submissions and to assign 
grades.   
Although often the subject of comment, the RAE’s effect on research 
performance has not been definitively established largely due to methodological flaws in 
existing studies.  Unfortunately all quantitative analyses were based on UK papers, rather 
than UK university papers, meaning that trends in publishing by hospitals, firms and non-
profits could influence conclusions.  The flimsy evidentiary base tends to suggest that the 
RAE may have increased the research performance of universities: in the 1990s and up to 
2005, the number of papers per UK researcher increased (Moed, 2007); the UK's share of 
world citations rose (Lipsett, 2005); and the share of UK papers that remain uncited 
decreased (DTI, 2007, 3.05).   
Qualitative evidence indicates the mechanisms at work.  Researchers and 
administrators agree that one effect of the RAE was to create much more focus on how 
and where to publish (HEFCE, 1997, 132).  Researchers and administrators disagreed 
about whether the quality of research had improved, though a limited sample of journal 
editors thought that they were seeing better submissions (HEFCE, 1997, 123-124).  
McNay interviewed administrators and faculty individually and in focus groups finding 
that at the management level, the RAE had prompted institutions to conduct strategic 
reviews for the first time (HEFCE, 1997, 50).  The RAE generated “awareness of the link 
between individual performance and the funding of the institution” (HEFCE, 1997, 82). 
At the faculty level some “said that competition was nevertheless a good and motivating 
factor. . . .They were more strategic in thinking about their careers, and appraisal was 
assisting in this” (HEFCE, 1997, 99).   UK Vice-Chancellors believe that the benefits 
arising from the RAE included: the provision of an evidence base for Government to 
increase research funding, important feedback for university managers and an improved 
international recognition of the strength of UK research (DEST, 2006, p.1).   
Several studies based on questionnaires have appeared, but Gläser et al note they 
were not scrupulous about reporting sampling procedures, investigating bias due to non-
response or constructing questions carefully to avoid passing on negative assumptions 
about the RAE to the respondents.  Gläser et al also argue that the known fact that 
processes like the RAE reduce researcher autonomy creates in respondents a negative 
bias in answering questions regarding the effect of the RAE on research performance.  
This issue was not addressed in these studies.  Nor do the studies investigate factors that 
may shape respondents’ responses such as type of university, field, gender or seniority.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the responses concerning the relationship between the 
RAE and research quality gathered in these surveys (Gläser et al., 2002). 
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Table 1 – Summary of survey results concerning research quality  





McNay, 1997 140 heads of 
units 
Research quality better than 5 years ago 81 
McNay, 1997 393 faculty Improvement of their own public research output 64 
Talib, 2001 305 faculty The RAE has had a positive effect on my 
research output 
39 
McNay, 1997 393 faculty On balance the RAE has improved the quality of 
research conducted in higher education 
34 
Talib, 2001 305 faculty  On balance the RAE has improved the quality of 






RAE “encouraged researchers to concentrate on 
the quality of their research” 
52 
Source: derived from Gläser et al., 2002, page 8 
Although faculty may be loath to admit it, UK university research output and the 
quality of the output seems likely to have increased in response to the RAE.  In all 
likelihood, performance increased because the RAE put in place incentives that realized 
latent capacity in the university system.  For example, administrators began conducting 
strategic reviews, and researchers began to work longer hours (SQW, 1996).  Attention 
was focused on publishing in good journals.  U.K. research became more meritocratic 
and competitive.  Mobility increased because there was an institutional payoff to 
increases in research performance.   
Eventually, however, latent capacity is exhausted and more resources must be 
added to keep increasing performance.  Universities will require more money to pay the 
substantially increased salaries the most eminent scholars now command.  Between 2002 
and 2006 the number of academics earning more than £100,000 increased by 169%.  This 
increase was fueled by increases in pay in medical and business schools and for 
administrators (Sanders, 2006).  And resources will have to be added to facilitate, for 
example, reducing teaching loads for promising researchers (Wojtas, 2007) 
Although criticism of the RAE for being ineffective seems misplaced, allegations 
of structural bias have gained more traction (Martin, 2007).  The assessment panels were 
disciplinary and found it difficult to assess interdisciplinary research, which suffered as a 
result.  The panels of academics did not pay equal attention to user-focused research - as 
requested by the government.  Institutions represented on a panel tended to get the 
highest ranking. When one side of a dispute over appropriate directions for research in a 
field dominated a panel, it created the sense that there were “insiders” and “outsiders” to 
the exercise (HEFCE, 1997, 114 & 117).   
The RAE is also burdensome.  70 panels of 10 or more members must be 
convened and work on assessing 180,000 publications making the exercise expensive.  
 7
Panels are expected to read papers, though given the impossibility of comprehensive 
reading, panels vary in their implementation of this (Harman, 2000, p. 115).  One author 
noted that the exercise is conducted as if it were supposed to appraise 50,000 individual 
researchers and their 180,000 pieces of work in order to make 160 funding decisions 
(Sastry & Bekhradnia, 2006), which seems disproportionate.  There are also indirect costs 
born by departments whose effort in preparing submissions has increased with each 
round.  
Gläser et al. conclude that as a peer review process, the RAE is subject to the 
same criticisms as peer review itself, namely that the process discourages unorthodox, 
new or risky research, encourages a short term focus and disadvantages interdisciplinary 
research (since peer review panels are constructed along disciplinary lines).  Gläser and 
others express the related concern that the variety of topics selected and perspectives 
applied in research may decrease as a result of the RAE; “homogenization” is a term 
applied in this context.  Gläser et al. conclude that the discussion in the literature can be 
read as suggesting that the RAE (and indeed other evaluation based methods of research 
funding) “improve quality to the upper middle level and drive out low quality research 
but suppress excellence to a certain extent” (Gläser et al., 2002, p. 22). 
The question becomes, do the benefits outweigh the costs or vice versa?  Geuna 
and Martin have argued that in the early years benefits probably outweighed costs 
because resources were shifted away from weaker to stronger performers which 
encouraged improved performance.  However, after several rounds the gains from 
initiating departmental research strategies have been realized while the cost of the 
exercise continues to increase because ever more effort is devoted to submissions.  
Furthermore, over time people learn and respond to the incentives in the RAE and 
deleterious effects on research behavior appear, such as avoiding risky research.  Today 
the costs probably outweigh the benefits (Geuna & Martin, 2003). 
This argument seems plausible.  Early on the requirements of the RAE were 
simpler, and so the exercise cost less, while the RAE introduced explicit incentives for 
research performance into a system for the first time no doubt realizing latent capacity. 
Today the system likely runs at peak capacity while the exercise has become much more 
elaborate.  Rather than dropping the incentives, UK government actions suggest more 
interest in reducing cost.  Costs have been reduced below what might have been expected 
because the intervals between RAE’s increased from 3 years to 4, 5 and now 7 years, 
reducing the frequency.  Cost reduction through simplification has also been discussed by 
way of substituting a formula based on research grant funding and bibliometric 
indicators.  This method would have the virtue of responding to government concerns 
that user oriented and interdisciplinary research is undervalued in the RAE process.  The 
2008 RAE will incorporate a “shadow metrics exercise” in a bid to shape any successor 
to the RAE (HERO, 2007).   
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The Australian Composite Index, Research Quality 
Framework (RQF), and Excellence in Research for 
Australia (ERA) initiative 
The Australian government has evaluated the research in its universities using the 
Composite Index since 1995 using the results to inform the distribution of part of the 
research portion of general university funds.  In 2004, 7% of all research support in 
Australian universities was allocated based on the Composite Index. ii   
The Composite Index is a formula calculated at the university level (not at the 
departmental level of the RAE or NRC rankings).  The formula calculates each 
university’s share of total research activity so in essence, it is a ranking of universities 
(not an assignment of grades like the RAE).  The components of the formula are research 
funding – grants from government, other public sector and industry – and outputs: 
number of publications and graduate degrees completed (MS and PhD’s).  Universities 
submit lists of publications.  Somewhat distressing were the results of audits conducted 
by KPMG of publication lists submitted by universities which found a high error rate 
(34% in the second audit in 1997); 97% of errors affected final scores and so funding 
allocations (Harman, 2000, pp. 118-119).  
In comparison to the RAE, the Composite Index is a simple thing. That very 
simplicity elicited a very clear response to its incentives which has been analyzed by 
Butler (Butler, 2003).  Over time, the publication portion of the formula became focused 
on papers indexed in the Web of Science databases such as the Science Citation Index 
(SCI). After a few iterations of funding distributed using the Composite Index, 
universities could put a dollar value on a paper placed in a journal indexed in the Science 
Citation Index. In the year 2000, such a paper was worth AUS$ 800 to a university, while 
a book from a recognized publisher was worth AUS$ 4,000.  Butler found that Australian 
university output increased 8% annually between 1992 and 1996, while the SCI grew at 
2% per year.  Seemingly the policy had achieved a notable success: greater research 
output without greater resources, or increased efficiency in the university research 
system.   
Unfortunately, Butler also found that the impact of Australia’s research fell over 
the same period.  Between 1988 and 1993 Australia’s citation impact dropped from 6th to 
11th among OECD countries.  Analysis revealed that Australian researchers were 
publishing more papers, but in journals with lower average citation impact (impact 
factor).  This suggests that while the apparent volume of research produced increased, the 
apparent quality of Australian research suffered.  Butler’s analysis provided a very clear 
demonstration of a response to a policy’s incentives that was ironically detrimental to the 
overall goals of the policy.   
Butler’s point was accepted by the Australian government under John Howard 
and a new system was devised – the Research Quality Framework or RQF.  The rationale 
was that the Composite Index did not reward research excellence or encourage the wider 
community to increase its investment in research and so a broader assessment of quality 
and impact was required (Australian Government DEST, 2006. p. 9).  The design of the 
RQF was notable for the extensive consultation behind it; the massively increased 
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complexity of the exercise in comparison to the Composite Index, and the 
correspondingly increased sophistication in the metrics to be used. 
The recommended RQF methodology was developed by an advisory group in 
2006 who built on the work of a prior advisory group.  The group developed a set of 
guiding principles for the RQF, solicited feedback from every university, talked to senior 
UK academics and consulted widely in Australia with groups representing business and 
education.  The details of the methodology were fleshed out by four working groups 
covering: quality metrics, research impact, information technology and exploratory 
modeling. 
Not unrelated to this wide consultative exercise was the increased complexity of 
the RQF.  The RQF was RAE-like in that 13 subject area panels of 12 members, at least 
three foreign and three end users, would be convened to consider the submissions and 
metrics of each research group in the country.  The submissions were to comprise staff 
lists, evidence of collaboration, awards won, students and their employment destinations, 
grant income, the four best outputs for each researcher, a full list of outputs, evidence, 
including indicators, of impact against generic and panel specific impact criteria; up to 
four case studies illustrating impact, and end user referees who might be contacted to 
verify impact claims.  For each group, the metrics were to report: the distribution of 
output across (unweighted) discipline-specific tiers of output; the citations per 
publication; the proportion of work that falls into the top citation percentiles in its field.  
After considering this information the panels were to assign each group scores on two 
five point scales representing research quality and research impact.  The exercise would 
be conducted every six years.   
The increased complexity in comparison to the Composite Index is obvious.  The 
RQF was also more complex than the RAE.  Scores on two scales would be assigned, not 
one as in the RAE.  And most importantly, the RQF moved assessment to the level of the 
research group, where the Composite Index assessed at the university level, and the RAE 
at the departmental level.  Given that research groups do not have the stability of 
officially recognized legal or administrative entities and can be quite fluid in their 
makeup, and that the assessment cycle was to be 6 years long, problems could be 
anticipated.  Notably, the performance of groups may not be independently measurable 
even given directives such as: if a collaborative paper is submitted by researchers 
belonging to more than one research group, it must be “with the respective contributions 
duly reflected” (Gläser et al., 2004; DEST, 2007, p. 17).  Whereas cost reduction is under 
discussion in the U.K., the RQF prompted requests for increased support (DEST, 2007, p. 
1). 
In December 2007, the government of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd replaced that 
of Prime Minister John Howard.  On February 26, 2008, the Minister for Innovation, 
Industry, Science and Research announced a new research quality and evaluation system 
to be called ERA – Excellence in Research for Australia, to replace the “now defunct” 
RQF.  The ERA announcement describes the new system as workable, streamlined and 
transparent.  The system has yet to be finalized, so details are not available.  The proposal 
is for a progressive (rather than simultaneous) examination of discipline clusters by 
institution to identify internationally competitive and emerging areas.  Research quality 
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will be assessed “using a combination of metrics and expert review by committees 
comprising experienced, internationally-recognized experts” (Carr, 2008). 
The idea behind ERA seems to be to add expert review and international 
comparison to the Composite Index’s focus on departmental comparison using metrics 
only.  Carried over from the RQF process is a sophisticated appreciation that appropriate 
metrics vary by discipline and will need to be tailored in consultation with disciplinary 
experts.  However, ERA will jettison the complexity of evaluation at the research group 
level and detailed submission requirements.   
Discussion and Conclusions 
Comparing the NRC rankings, RAE, Composite Index, RQF, and ERA enables us 
to identify common themes in the evolution of national university system research 
evaluation.  Notable is a tension between increasing complexity and practicality.  
Complexity is reflected in methodological choices that in some cases seem rash.  Neither 
the RQF goal of assessing at the research group level, nor the NRC goal of compiling a 
full (and presumably correct) bibliography and citation count for every U.S. academic has 
been accomplished on anywhere near the proposed scale and accuracy before.  Not 
surprisingly, the RQF is gone, and the NRC ranking process threatens to consume a 
decade.  The complexity of submissions required by the RAE has increased over the 
years; as well departments have elaborated their submissions over time in an effort to 
become more competitive.  This raises questions about the cost/benefit ratio of the 
exercise, and the UK government has pondered a metrics-only future for the RAE.   
Complexity emerges in these systems as a response to consultation which 
produces pressures for fairness across heterogeneous academic disciplines.  Presumably, 
complexity increases easily in the absence of any accounting of the full cost.  I have not 
found estimates of the full cost of any of these exercises, which precludes systematic 
analysis of cost/benefit ratio.  Any estimate of full cost would need to account both for 
the work at the center, that is the framing then gathering of submissions and the work of 
the panels, as well as the work embedded in the system, that is the time and effort spent 
compiling the submissions.  Perhaps even the cost of time spent in consultation and 
argument in the design phase should be incorporated. 
The role of peer evaluation versus quantitative metrics, in particular bibliometrics 
(paper and citation counts, impact factors), is also worth considering.  To someone with a 
background in bibliometrics, such as this author, the techniques seem well suited to the 
task of large scale evaluations of research.  In addition, throughout the 1980s when these 
evaluation systems were initiated, each country housed world renowned specialists in the 
techniques, offering expertise that could be drawn upon in designing evaluation 
systems.iii  It is rather surprising therefore to find that bibliometrics has played little or no 
role in the British or U.S. evaluation systems.   
The RAE has been the canonical exercise in peer evaluation of a nation’s 
university departments, with no formal metrics component.  However, we see in the U.K. 
some desire to move to a quantitative formula and eliminate the peer panels.  If this 
happens, the move from peer panels to formula will contrast strikingly with the move 
being implemented in Australia from a very simple formula to peer panels informed by 
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metrics.  The NRC 1995 ranking was strongly driven by peer evaluation, though not the 
informed peer review of the panel exercises; rather the NRC used an opinion survey to 
elicit peer rankings.  NRC now judges this inadequate and aims to rank departments on 
quantitative variables.  If, as seems likely, the opinion survey results correlate with a few 
mostly size related variables the basis for the final NRC ranking could in fact be fairly 
similar to the Australian Composite index or the “shadow metrics exercise.”  Thus we 
may see a convergence of method towards peer informed, metrics based, departmental 
level evaluation.   
Metrics invariably include bibliometric variables.  Any “shadow metrics exercise” 
in the RAE will include bibliometrics.  The ERA seems likely to include a quite 
sophisticated suite of bibliometric indicators compiled centrally.  The NRC ranking 
variables include three bibliometric measures compiled centrally.  Table 2 records notes 
on the inclusion of bibliometrics and its role in the evaluation judgments. 
Table 2 – Bibliometrics in university evaluation exercises 
Evaluation exercises 
 US UK Australia 
Old NRC 1995 RAE Composite Index 
New NRC 2000-2008 Shadow metrics 
exercise 
ERA 
    
Does bibliometrics play a role? 
 US UK Australia 
Old No, reputational ranking, 
though bibliometric data 
present in appendix 
No, 4 papers per faculty 
member submitted for 
“reading” 
Yes, paper counts, along 
with funding 
New Yes, full departmental 
bibliography with citation 
count 
Yes, along with funding 
indicators 
Yes, now internationally 
comparative 
 
What is the primary basis for the evaluation? 
 US UK Australia 
Old Peer judgment, survey 
based 
Peer judgment Indicator based, 
bibliometrics prominent 
New Indicator based, weight of 




Peer judgment with 
weight of bibliometrics 
unknown at present 
Again we see convergence in that three exercises that initially eschewed or 
simplified bibliometrics are moving to incorporate more sophisticated bibliometrics.   In 
seeking to explain this movement, I can only speculate that over the past decade advances 
in computing have made system level metrics seem more cost effective and achievable.  
It may also be that when the systems were initially implemented, academics were loath to 
accept the idea of evaluation, and the inclusion of bibliometrics would have made 
evaluations even more controversial.  After a decade or so, academics have adapted to 
 12
evaluation and bibliometrics may seem like just another methodological tweak, with 
advantages and disadvantages like the rest. 
Notable in each system is evidence that universities are extremely responsive to 
hierarchical ranking.  One effect of the RAE was to create what McNay termed assured, 
aspiring and anxious universities (HEFCE, 1997, 47).  Attention devoted to RAE 
submissions has not decreased, even though as mentioned above, Sastry and Bekhradnia 
calculated that the median impact on total university revenue of the last exercise was 
0.6%.  A clear response to the Australian exercise was elicited even though it effected 
only 7% of university research revenue, and so an even smaller portion of total university 
revenue.  And the rankings in the United States shape university strategy even though no 
money is attached to them at all. 
Marginson noted in relation to the introduction of a university assessment in 
Australia in 1993: 
Nothing less than the positional status of every institution were at stake; 
the process of competitive ranking had a compelling effect, leading to the rapid 
spread of a reflective culture of continuous improvement. (Marginson, 1997, p. 
74) 
Harman relates that in Australia allocation of funding based on the Composite 
Index has become “an important vehicle for developing status hierarchies” as data are 
published in newspapers and widely used (Harman, 2000, p. 116).  Perhaps most 
tellingly, many UK universities may now be choosing high ranking over more money.  
RAE 2008 allows selective inclusion of faculty members.   
. . . research-intensive institutions indicated that they would seek the best 
ratings rather than the financial rewards that could be won by entering more 
staff. (Lipsett, 2007) 
Even without an explicit tie to funding distribution, universities will seek to rise in 
rankings over time.  Thus, greater scientific productivity is achieved for the cost of the 
evaluation, which is presumably less than the cost of increasing research funding.  
Far from being a fad or passing preoccupation of one or another government, over 
the past two decades national university departmental ranking exercises have become 
embedded in several systems.  The exercises effectively focus universities’ attention on 
improving their research enterprises.  The methods have evolved towards combinations 
of peer evaluation and bibliometrics.  However, exercises designed in consultation with 
the academic community tend to become increasingly elaborate, to the point of becoming 
unwieldy.  Going forward the challenge will be to find a balanced system that is fair to 
different disciplines, with costs that are fully accounted for and controlled, that takes 
advantage of sophisticated bibliometric and computational techniques to ensure accuracy, 
and that can be conducted swiftly enough that results reflect current departmental 
configurations at their release.  Finally, it might be best if the systems are continually 
tweaked because this will make it more difficult for universities to focus simply on 
improving scores on specific indicators and more likely that the only sure route to success 
will be a long term focus on improving the research enterprise. 
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i Only research evaluation is considered here.  The teaching and social or economic development 
missions of universities are not discussed. 
ii  The portion of research funding based on the evaluation results was called the “research 
quantum” until 2001 and the “institutional grants scheme” thereafter.  In 2004, the Institutional Grants 
Scheme accounted for AU $285 million of AU $4,283 in R&D funding in universities (HERD) (Australian 
Vice Chancellors Committee, 2005, Table A.1; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006, p. 3).   
iii In the UK were found Ben Martin and John Irvine at SPRU, University of Sussex; in Australia 
Paul Bourke and Linda Butler at the Australian National University in Canberra; and in the U.S., Francis 
Narin of CHI Research and also ISI, now Thomson Scientific, provider of the Science Citation Index, the 
database most used for bibliometric analysis. 
